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INTRODUCTION

Judicial intervention into the reporting of criminal proceedings
is a relatively recent phenomenon. The last two decades have seen
an increasing judicial sensitivity to the potential conflict between
unhampered reportage of those proceedings and the sixth amend
ment fair trial rights of criminal defendants. In Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale,l the Supreme Court ruled that courts may close pre
trial proceedings to the press and public when prejudicial publicity
1.

443

u.s. 368 (1979).
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threatens fair trial rights. Since it was decided, the case's applica
bility to different circumstances has been widely controverted. This
comment will examine what Gannett portends and will establish a
theory of a right of personal access to criminal trials.

II.
A.

HISTORY OF THE ISSUE

Setting the Stage for Gannett

The bedrock on which modern courts have built the frame
work of permissible restrictions on the press is Near v. Minnesota. 2
The Court ruled that liberty of the press demands immunity from
previous restraints or censorship.3 The Court noted a few excep
tions to this rule,4 but there was no doubt after Near that there
was a heavy presumption against the validity· of prior restraints on
the press. Absent unusual circumstances, the press is free to pub
lish what it knows.
If in the course of a criminal trial, however, the press learns of
and publishes prejudicial information which would not be admissi
ble as evidence, its 'right to publish what it knows squarely con
fronts the right of the defendant to a fair trial. In Sheppard v.
Maxwell ,5 the Court confronted such a case. 6 Overturning
Sheppard's conviction, the Court made it clear that Near did not
prevent a trial judge from exercising control over sources of press
infol'Il)ation. Adverse effects on courtroom atmosphere created by
the press were held to be directly controllable by the judge, as
master of the premises. 7 The Court further held that the release of
information by the police, counsel and witnesses may be prohibited
by the trial court. 8 The Court declared that trial judges, other offi
cers of the court and the police must place the interest of justice
first, leaving the news media to the task of reporting cases as they
2. 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (statute which pennitted publication of "a malicious,
scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical" to be enjoined
held unconstitutional).
3. Id. at 716.
4. Id. The exceptions included publications that would hinder a war effort, of
fend decency, or incite acts of violence or overthrow of the government. The Court
did not intend the list to be exclusive. It indicated that the list typified the genre of
subject material which might legitimately be subject to prior restraint. Id.
5. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
6. During the murder trial the press had published clearly inadmissible mate
rial consisting of leads, infonnation and gossip made available by police officers,
witnesses and the counsel for both sides. Id. at 359.
7. Id. at 358.
8. Id. at 359.
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unfold in the courtroom-not pieced together from extrajudicial
statements. 9
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,IO the Court ad
dressed the constitutionality of an attempt to restrain the press
from reporting prejudicial information which it possessed or might
come to possess, as opposed to restraint on sources of that informa
tion. The trial court's gag order, 11 issued at the request of both the
prosecution and the defense, as finally modified by the Nebraska
Supreme Court,12 forbade the reporting of confessions or admis
sions made to anyone except members of the press, and any other
facts strongly implicative of the accused. The Supreme Court held
that this was a prior restraint on publication and ruled that the
heavy presumption against its validity imposed by Near had not
been overcome. First, the Court noted that even pervasive adverse
pre-trial publicity does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial. 13 The
tone, extent and sources of the information, as well as the court's
efforts to mitigate its effects, may de'termine whether the defend
ant receives a trial consistent with the requirements of due proc
ess. 14 Even when there has been a finding of a substantial likeli
hood of impairment of fair trial rights by unchecked publicity, the
Court said that alternative methods of protecting those rights must
be found to be inadequate before prior restraint is justified. When
prior restraint appears warranted, it must be shown to be manage
able, enforceable and capable of reaching and stifling publications
that could carry the target information into the court's jurisdiction.
Finally, the court must find that without the restriction, there
could not be a fair trial. To be valid, the restriction must be nar
row and precise, reaching only that which would prejudice the de
fendant's rights and no more. IS
9. Id. at 362.
10. 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (gag order prohibiting publication of confessions, ad
missions and other 'facts strongly implicative of defendant is prior restraint, subject to
heavy presumption against validity which was not overcome by fair trial interests in
this case).
11. Defense attorneys tend to call court orders which restrain publication pro
tective orders. Media counsel call them gag orders. The terms are synonymous.
12. State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975), rev'd sub nom.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Nebraska Supreme Court
found that prior restraint was justified by the possible effect of pretrial publicity on
fair trial rights, and modified the trial court's gag order, which had forbidden dissem
ination of all testimony or evidence adduced in a pretrial hearing, into the form de
clared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Nebraska Press. Id.
13. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 554.
14. Id. at 555.
15. Id. at 565-69.

726

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:723

Before discussing Gannett, a decision triggered by a court's at
tempt to deal with the limitations on press restraint imposed by
Nebraska Press, one other strain of Supreme Court cases should be
examined. Pell v. Procunier,16 Saxbe v. Washington Post CO.17 and
Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 18 all dealt with an asserted first amend
ment right of the press to gain access to prisons for purposes of
gathering information and reporting on inmates and conditions in
the rehabilitation system. The Court ruled that the press possesses
no special right of access to prisons over and above that enjoyed by
the general public. The Court rejected the idea that the Constitu
tion imposes upon government an affirmative duty to make availa
ble to journalists sources of information not available to members
of the public generally.19 Since the restrictions imposed on the
general public were validly grounded in legitimate concerns for se
curity and the integrity of the rehabilitative scheme, the press
could not complain of being bound by the same strictures. The
rule synthesized by the Pell, Saxbe and Houchins triumvirate is
that the press has a right to gather information from any available
source, but it may not successfully resort to the first amendment to
compel anyone, including the government, to supply that informa
tion. 20 Where a right of access to government-controlled sources of
information has been granted the public, the rights of the press co
incide, but do not extend further.
B.

The Gannett Decision

Mter Nebraska Press, many trial courts despaired of ever be
ing able to formulate a gag order that would pass muster under the
stringent standards of that case. 21 Faced with situations in which
16. 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (prison inmates and journalists sought to enjoin a state
prison regulation prohibiting media interviews with specific individual inmates).
17. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). Saxbe presented the same issue as Pell, although
within the federal prison system. Id. The cases were decided on the same day.
18. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). A television station was denied permiSSion to send a
news crew into a prison to report on conditions which may have led to a suicide.
The station and the NAACP filed suit, alleging a violation of first amendment rights,
claiming that information on the jail was essential to permit public debate on condi
tions there. At the time, no public tours of the facility were permitted.
19. Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. at 850.
20. "The press is free to do battle against secrecy and deception in govern
ment. But the press. cannot expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it will
succeed. There is no constitutional right [of the press) to have access to particular
government information, or to require openness from the bureaucracy." Stewart, "Or
of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975).
21. Although Chief Justice Burger's Nebraska Press majority opinion allows for
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they perceived a danger to fair trial rights due to unrestricted re
portage of criminal proceedings, trial judges began to tum to clo
sure orders to protect defendants from the effects of prejudicial
publicity, at least to the extent that the publicity originated in the
courtroom. "You can't let'em in and then tell'em not to report
what they see and hear," said Nebraska Press. "But nobody says
you have to let 'em in," said Pell, Saxbe and Houchins. Or so it
seemed. By closing the court to all but the participants in a crimi
nal proceeding, the courts hoped to curtail press reports of those
events which would arguably prejudice the ability of the fact finder
to determine the defendant's innocence or guilt according to the
proper standards of evidence and law. 22 Coupled with the power,
confirmed in Sheppard, to regulate courtroom atmosphere and
sources of information within the control of the court, the closed
courtroom appeared to close a significant chink in the judicially
tailored armor protecting defendants' fair trial rights.
In Gannett, the Court upheld a trial court order which closed
a pre-trial suppression hearing on prejudicial publicity grounds. A
newspaper claimed a right of access based on the first, sixth and
fourteenth amendments. 23 Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justhe possibility of a constitutional gag order, the concurring opinIOns of Justices
Brennan (joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall), White and Stevens indicate that a
majority of the Justices believe that such an order is never permissible. See Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 570 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
22. See, e.g., Buffalo Courier-Express v. Stiller, 62 App. Div. 2d 1173 (1978); In
re Merola, 5 MED. L. RPTR. (BNA) 1033 (App. Div. N.Y., 1979).
23. The hearing was on a motion to suppress incriminating statements and
other evidence, including a revolver, in connection with a New York prosecution for
a 1976 murder. Police theorized that the victim, whose body was never found, was
shot with the revolver, his own gun, while with two defendants on his boat on a
lake. The two fled with a 16 year old companion in the victim's truck. Police found
the truck in Michigan, and arrested the trio shortly thereafter. One of them led po
lice to the gun. Gannett operated a newspaper in the vicinity of the crime which
duly reported all of this information. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 371-75.
At the hearing, the defendants claimed that they had made incriminating state
ments involuntarily and moved to suppress the physical evidence as the fruit of
those involuntary statements. Defense attorneys argued that the unabated buildup of
adverse publicity had jeopardized the defendants' ability to obtain a fair trial and
moved that the press and public be excluded from the hearing. Neither the district
attorney nor a reporter for the Gannett paper present at the hearing objected. The
trial judge granted the motion. [d. at 374-75.
The next day, the reporter wrote to the judge, asserting a right to attend. The
judge responded the same day, noted that the hearing was over and set a date for a
hearing on Gannett's motion to set aside the closure order. He refused to vacate the
order at the hearing, and Gannett started the appeal process, alleging violation of
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tice Stewart said that the trial judge has an affirmative duty to mini
mize the effects of prejudicial publicity and may take protective
steps even if they have not been shown to be strictly necessary.24 If
one of those protective steps is the closure of the proceeding, the
press may not successfully raise objections to it based on the sixth
amendment right to a public trial. That right is personal to the de
fendant and may not be asserted by anyone else. Justice Stewart
said that the adversary system of criminal justice is premised upon
the proposition that the public interest is fully protected by the
participants in the litigation. 25 This protection is largely a function
of the duty of prosecutors to be servants of the law, placing justice
before their interest in obtaining convictions. This duty requires
sensitivity to the defendant's due process rights to a fair trial, a
sensitivity also required of trial judges. The public interest in the
fair administration of justice is thus protected by the judge and the
prosecutor, who represent the public. The protection is still intact,
therefore, when the court accedes to a request for a closed court. 26
It is clear from the context of the opinion, however, that the
"public interest" of which Justice Stewart speaks is limited to the
interest in affording the benefits which public trails are presumed
to provide for the defendant. These are primarily due process guar
antees, in Justice Stewart's view. The opinion does not address the
public's interest in open trials beyond questioning whether an in
dependent public interest in the enforcement of sixth amendment
guarantees exists, and whether that putative interest alone creates
a constitutional right on the part of the public to open proceed
ings.27
The Court next addressed the history of the open trial, sum
marily declaring it to show no more than a "common-law rule" of
open civil and criminal proceedings. 28 The Court said that few
such rules have been elevated to the status of constitutional

first, sixth and fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 375-76. The intermediate appel
late court vacated the order. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 55 App. Div. 2d 107, 389
N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977),
afI'd, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
24. 443 U.S. at 378.
25. Id. at 383-84.
26. While criminal defendants have a constitutional right to a public trial, they
do not have the right to compel a private trial. The court may veto a waiver of the
constitutional right. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
27. 443 U.S. at 383.
28. Id. at 384. See also notes 60-66 infra and accompanying text.
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rights 29 and that the public trial rule was not one of them. The
rule merely establishes the norm of openness which is presumed
by the sixth amendment. 30 This, of course, stops short of saying
that the amendment requires openness. The Court found it unnec
essary to rule on whether the amendment was intended by the
Framers to incorporate the "rule" of openness as a requirement be
cause it determined that the common law treated pre-trial proceed
ings, like the one under review, differently from full trials. They
were never characterized by the same degree of openness as were
actual trials. 31 Therefore, even if the sixth amendment incorpora
ted the common-law rule of openness, it would not extend to this
case, a pre-trial hearing.
But to adhere to this reasoning, given the facts in Gannett,
one must exalt form over substance, because suppression hearings,
like the one at issue here, took place at trial in open court at com
mon law. 32 They, therefore, must be considered part of the trial
for purposes of applying common-law or constitutional notions of
openness. The pre-trial hearings to which the common law at
tached no presumption of openness were typically preliminary pro
ceedings, on the order of probable cause hearings,33 held before an
indictment was returned or before a person was bound over for
trial.
29. 443 U.S. at 384. The Court cited the common-law right to a jury trial as an
example of a common-law rule which was given constitutional recognition. The
common-law rule that jurors could testify against a defendant is one which has been
rejected. Id. at 385.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 387-88.
32. Id. at 437 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The pre-trial suppression hearing is
the close equivalent of a trial on the merits for purposes of applying public trial doc
trine. It is often of critical importance, and may be decisive in the prosecution of a
criminal case. Its outcome, especially where a confession is concerned, may virtually
dictate the outcome of the case. Id. at 434-37.
Moreover, such hearings are often the only judicial proceedings of importance
that occur during a criminal prosecution, offering the public its only opportunity to
view the legal and factual issues. This is because, nationwide, most felony prosecu
tions are terminated without a trial on the merits. Id. at 434-35.
Perhaps most importantly, suppression hearings typically involve allegations of
police or prosecution misconduct. Such misconduct by public officials is a matter for
public concern. The hearing will usually be the only opportunity the public will
have to learn of misconduct, since the evidence ille.gally produced will normally not
be allowed to surface at trial. Id. at 435-36.
33. Id. at 437. The distinction between preliminary and non-preliminary pro
ceedings is that the former lead to a trial vel non, and the latter may lead to a convic
tion. Id. at 394-95 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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Having decided to rely on the common-law trial/pre-trial dis
tinction nonetheless, the Gannett majority announced, in a case
which arose in a pre-trial hearing, that members of the public have
no constitutional right under the sixth and fourteenth amendments
to attend criminal trials. 34 This declaration came despite the
Court's misplaced reliance (since suppression hearings were histor
ically held at trial) on English notions of pre-trial openness, the ab
sence of need for such a broad ruling to decide the case, and the
historically different treatment which the Court acknowledged was
accorded to trials.
Curiously, while the Court's analysis of the sixth amendment
public right to attend trials is long and detailed, study of the first
amendment as a basis for the right, which was also urged by
Gannett, was given short shrift. Assuming, without deciding, that
the first and fourteenth amendments provided a guarantee of ac
cess in the case, the Court declared that the trial court had given
appropriate deference to that right by balancing the constitutional
rights of the press and the public against the defendant's right to a
fair trial. The trial court's decision that there was a "reasonable
probability of prejudice to these defendants" was enough to over
come a first amendment right of access, assuming, as the trial
judge did, that that right existed under the circumstances. 35
The four-Justice dissent,36 written by Justice Blackmun, con
tains a long discussion of the history of the public trial guarantee,
and concludes that the right is not personal to the defendant, but
inheres in the public. Blackmun traced a rationale for the right
based on the public interest in the impartial administration of just
ice and the necessity of safeguarding the truthfulness of testimony.
The dissent found no evidence in the history of the common-law
public trial right or the colonial public trial provisions that pre
dated the Constitution to indicate that the Founders intended the
sixth amendment to be invocable only by defendants. 37 The dissent
noted that the right to attend court proceedings is limited and may
be overcome by a showing of strict and inescapable necessity to
protect fair trial rights. 38 The dissent found that that showing was
34. Id. at 443 U.S. at 391.
35. Id. at 392-93.
36. Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, White and Marshall
joined Justice Blackmun's dissent in part.
37. Id. at 418-33.
38. Id. at 439-40.
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not made in Gannett. Since this point of view would be disposative
of the case, the dissent did not deem it necessary to address the
first amendment issue.
C.

Judicial Confusion Over Gannett

The reaction to Gannett in the nation's trial courts was quick,
confused and pervasive. The decision was rendered on July 2,
1979. As of late August, trial judges had agreed to about half of
some fifty requests to close courtrooms. A few judges barred the
press but not the public, and others closed off not only pre-trial
hearings but actual trials and sentencings. 39 In one case, a trial
court set aside its pre-trial closure order, but required a newspa
per's counsel to attend the proceedings to advise its reporter as to
what information could be published. 40 In short, courts exhibited
widely varying interpretations of what the Gannett decision had
decided.
The most obvious problem confronting trial courts was
Gannett's applicability to full trials. The opinion said that there was
no sixth or fourteenth amendment right to attend criminal trials.
That language, however, was dicta in a case in which only the right
to attend a pre-trial hearing was at issue. Some post-Gannett deci
sions closed full trials, citing potentially prejudicial publicity. 41
Others allowed the court to remain open,42 even in cases where
there had been no press objection to closure,43 apparently on the

39. TIME, Sept. 17, 1979, at 82.
40. Keene Publishing Corp. v. Superior Court, 406 A.2d 137 (1979) (require
ment that ~ounsel advise the reporter as to what may be published is an unconsti
tutional prior restraint).
41. E.g., State v. Hudspeth, No. 54534 (Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Aug. 3,
1979) (murder trial was closed after defense motion on the grounds that the jury
might be prejudiced by news accounts of an incriminating tape recording that was to
be presented in court outside of the jury's presenc'e).
42. E.g., People v. Bartowsheski, No. 79CR-516 (18th Dist. Ct., Colo., 1979)
(defense motion to close murder trial on grounds that news accounts mightprejudice
impartial jury was denied) (prosecution opposed the motion); United States v. Barber,
476 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. w. Va. 1979) (defense motion to close parts of rape trial to the
press, but not to the public, or to gag the press on grounds that the jury might see
news accounts of portions of trial conducted outside of their presence was denied)
(prosecution and press objected).
43. E.g., People v. Angus, No. 104-69-78 (Albany County Ct., N.Y., 1979)
(motion by counsel for a witness to close a sodomy trial on grounds that news ac
counts of the witness' testimony would prejudice his fair trial rights during his own
trial on related charges denied) (defense counsel joined motion; press did not op
pose).
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theory that Gannett does not compel closure upon motion where
the judge finds little potential prejudice. 44
It is not surprising that trial judges came to disparate conclu
sions as to the scope of Gannett, since even the Justices of the Su
preme Court disagreed as to what it meant. In the months after
the decision issued, four Supreme Court Justices made separate ex
trajudicial statements about the case's significance. Chief Justice
Burger said that judges who barred the press and the public from
actual trials were misreading the decision. He suggested that
judges were reading newspaper reports on the case instead of the
decision itself.45 Justice Blackmun, who wrote the dissent, told a
group of federal judges that the opinion allowed full trials to be
closed. 46 Justice Powell emphasized that Gannett decided only the
sixth amendment access question; there might be a first amend
ment right to attend criminal trials. 47 Justice Stevens, however,
declared the case to be consistent with previous Court denials of a
right of the press to acquire information. 48 Chief Justice Burger
had what should stand as the final word on the extrajudicial expli
cations of Gannett. If jurists start publicly elaborating on their writ
ten opinions, he said, "we'll all be in the SOUp."49

III.

Gannett

SHOULD BE NARROWLY CONSTRUED

Many of these elements of the Gannett opinion, such as the
narrow interpretation of "public interest," the misapplication of the
common-law rule, the overbroad holding and the failure to ad
dress all the theories advanced in support of the right to attend,
combined with the confusion following the decision, are good rea
sons for restricting the case to its facts. The Court did not reach
the first amendment issue. The majority felt that the trial court's
handling of closure did not abuse the asserted first amendment
right, assuming arguendo that it existed. Arguably, a first amend
ment protected right of personal access to the courts should, in
fact, be recognized. 50 Indeed, Justice Powell's concurring opinion
in Gannett 51 does recognize such a right. 52 Although Justice Powell
44. See note 26 supra.
45.
46.

N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1979, at 17, col. 1.
note 39 supra.

TIME,

47. [d.
48. [d.
49.
50.
51.
52.

N.Y. Times, note 45 supra.
See notes 60-90 infra and accompanying text.
443 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
See note 56 infra and accompanying text.
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was the only member of the Court who expressed a first amend
ment view, the four dissenters also found a right of access, albeit in
the sixth amendment; and three of the four members of the
Gannett majority53 did not rule out the possibility of a first amend
ment right. 54 All of this indicates that, given the right case, per
haps one where the putative first amendment right is dismissed as
nonexistent without even the balancing act treatment accorded by
the Gannett trial court, the Court may well find at least a limited
first amendment right of access and begin the task of defining its
parameters. 55
53. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Stevens; But see Stevens,
Some Thoughts About A General Rule, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 599 (1979). Justice Stevens
says that the "general rule" developed by the Court in applying the first amend
ment:
draws a sharp distinction between the dissemination of information or ideas,
on the one hand, and the acquisition of newsworthy matter on the other.
Whereas the Court has accorded virtually absolute protection to the former,
it has never squarely held that the latter is entitled to any constitutional pro
tection whatsoever.
Id. at 602. Stevens finds many of the arguments advanced in favor of a right of access
"unpersuasive", but feels debate on the issue is "constructive", and "maximizes the
likelihood that legislators and other lawmakers will make constructive changes in the
rules relating to access to governmental proceedings." Id. at 603-04. He appears to
be solicitous to a legislative resolution of the issue of access. Id. at 605.
54. Justice Rehnquist's Gannett concurrence contends that there is "no First
Amendment right of access in the public or press to judicial or other governmental
proceedings." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 404.
55. The Supreme Court has an opportunity to consider the issue of personal ac
cess to criminal trials in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 5 MED. L. RPTR.
(BNA) 1545 (Va., 1979), prob. juris. noted, 100 S.Ct. 204 (1979) (No. 79-243). The
case involves a challenge to a Virginia statute which states that: "In the trial of all
criminal cases ... the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons
whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of
the accused to a public trial shall not be violated...." VA. CODE ~ 19.2-266(1975).
The trial court had excluded all members of the press and public from a murder
trial without notice, a hearing or any evidence being adduced that fair trial rights
were in jeopardy due to public attendance. The trial ended in two days. The court
found the defendant not guilty, by reason of the insufficiency of the state's evidence.
Virginia v. Stevenson, No. 68-A-77 (Hanover County Circuit Ct., Va. 1978). The
Virginia Supreme Court denied relief to the appellant newspapers and reporters with
a one-sentence reference to Gannett, seven days after the Supreme Court handed
down that decision.
The newspapers are contending that the right of access to criminal trials is a fun
damental constitutional right. They submit that although there is no agreement as to
the textual source of that right in the Constitution, the right is confirmed by shared
experience and common understanding, informed but not wholly defined by the first
and sixth amendments. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant at 17, Richmond News
papers, Inc. v. Virginia, prob. juris. noted, 100 S.Ct. 204 (1979) (No. 79-243).
The newspapers also assert that the Virginia statute violates the first, sixth, and
fourteenth amendments by virtue of allowing closure without a showing of a threat
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This is all the more likely because the Gannett majority is a
fragile alliance. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, who
joined Justice Stewart's majority opinion, construe the power of the
courts to restrict access to their proceedings more narrowly than
does the majority opinion itself Chief Justice Burger's concurring
opinion emphasizes that trials and pre-trial hearings are different,
historically governed by different presumptions of purpose and
openness. He joined the Stewart opinion because the case dealt
only with the pre-trial issue. Justice Powell concurred, but found a
limited first amendment right of public access to criminal courts.
To protect that right he would require, upon motion for closure:
consideration of alternatives; a tailored closure order, extending no
further than necessary to protect fair trial goals; an opportunity for
those interested to be heard on the question of closure; and a
showing by the defendant that public access will prejudice the fair
ness of the trial. 56 Justice Powell concluded that the Gannett trial
court procedure substantially complied with all of this, and he
joined the majority opinion. The majority, however, requires only
a balancing of fair trial and "putative" press rights of access; a "rea
sonable probability of prejudice to these defendants" defeats the
asserted press rights. That certainly does not approach the level of
protection provided by Justice Powell's apparatus. So the Gannett
opinion is an unsteady construction whose architects had different
concepts of the edifice they were building.
A final reason which militates for a narrow application of
Gannett concerns the genesis of the majority opinion. Press reports
indicate that the Gannett opinion was a result of a late-term vote
switch that transformed the dissenting opinion into the majority.
According to these accounts, both opinions were in nearly final
form when the switch, attributed to Justice Powell, occurred. Just
ice Blackmun's long analysis of the significance of public trials in
the Anglo-American legal tradition was transformed from the ma
jority opinion into a dissent, and the opinion for the Court was
built around Justice Stewart's former dissent. Supposedly, in the
pressure of finishing the Court's work by the end of the term, the
new majority opinion did not receive normal scrutiny by other
members of the majority. 57
to a significant interest, without a discussion of alternatives, without a showing of the
probable efficacy of closure, and without an effort to accommodate the right of access
to the court. [d. at 22-26.
56. 443 U.S. at 400-01 (Powell, J., concurring).
57. N.Y. Times, Sept. 4,1979, at A15, col. 1.
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Since dissenting opinions are often more argumentative and
more broadly worded than majority opinions, the apparent lack of
close final editing meant that some members of the majority signed
their names to language that went further than they intended. 58
If this is true, it could explain the existence of the sweeping and
unnecessary dicta in the Gannett majority opinion59 which has
been responsible for much of the confusion in interpreting the
case. These factors indicate that it would not be wise to extend the
holding in Gannett beyond its facts. Under the circumstances,
the opinion is simply not strong enough to support broader applica
bility.
IV.

A FIRST AND NINTH AMENDMENT RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO CRIMINAL TRIALS

A.

Common Law Origins of the Right of Access

The citizen's right of access to full trials had its ongm in the
English common law. The practice of holding court proceedings in
the open was already ancient and well established by Blackstone's
time. 6o It developed at a time when procedural safeguards for the
accused were uncommon. 61 The English cases indicate that the
public trial was perceived as a device to serve the interest of mem
bers of the public in the integrity of the court system apart from
and, if necessary, in opposition to the interests of the individual
defendant. 62 English courts recognized that such a policy could be
to the disadvantage of defendants, but held that this effect was out
weighed by the need to make the proceedings of the courts known
to common citizens. 63 The right of citizen access to trials was
58. Id.
59. See notes 28-34 supra and accompanying text.
60. One commentator says the English rule of openness dates from time imme
morial. E. JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73-74 (6th ed. 1967). The public trial
had its origins in the English custom of trial by the community, which predated the
Norman invasion of 1066. Since that time, there has been a continuous tradition of
community participation in English criminal trials. Even the trials of the notorious
Star Chamber were always held in public, which probably led to its demise as pub
lic opinion was aroused against it. Note, Legal History: Origins of the Public. Trial,
35 IND. L. J., 251, 251-54 (1960); See United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 847
(3d CiT. 1978) (district court order excluding the public from a pretrial suppression
hearing and sealing the record of the hearing reversed on first and sixth amendment
grounds as being more restrictive than necessary under the circumstances).
61. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 423 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., The King v. Wright, 101 Eng. Rep. 1396, 1399 (K.B. 1799).
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thought to be founded in public necessity, and was distinguished
from the right to attend pre-trial hearings. 64 This concept predates
the development of the complementary notion of the public trial as
a procedural safeguard of defendants' rights. 65 The English cases
indicate that the public necessity idea was the better developed
one at the time of the formation of the American republic. 66

B.

Purpose of the Right

In the abstract, the right to inspect the functioning of govern
ment institutions is concommitant to the inherent power of the citi
zenry to direct government, principally through the vote and the
power to petition and to act through elected representatives. Di
rection cannot take place in a vacuum of information. 67 The right
to observe fosters the intelligent discussion of government afIairs 68
[Ilt is one of the essential qualities of a Court of Justice that its proceedings
should be public, and that all parties who may be desirous of hearing what
is going on, if there be room in the place for that purpose,-provided they
do not interrupt the proceedings, and provided there is no specific reason
why they should be removed,-have a right to be present for the purpose of
hearing what is going on.
Daubney v. Cooper, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (K.B. 1829). "The general advantage to
the country in having these proceedings made public, more than counterbalances the
inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such
proceedings." The King v. Wright, 101 Eng. Rep. 1396, 1399 (K.B. 1799).
The publication of proceedings in courts of justice, where both sides are
heard, and matters are finally determined, is salutary, and therefore it is
permitted . . . . Trials at law fairly reported, although they may occasionally
prove injurious to individuals, have been held to be privileged. The benefit
they produce is great and permanent, and the evil that arises from them is
rare and incidental.
Rex v. Fisher, 170 Eng.Rep. 1253, 1255 (K.B. 1811).
64. "[Tlhese preliminary examinations have no such privilege. Their only tend
ency is to prejudice those whom the law still presumes to be innocent, and to poison
the sources of justice." Rex v. Fisher, 170 Eng. Rep. 1253, 1255 (K.B. 1811). The
English common law notion of "preliminary hearing" is limited to proceedings
preceeding the binding over a defendant for trial, however. It does not include sup
pression hearings. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
65. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 423-24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. "Indeed the first public trial provision to appear in America spoke in terms
of the right of the public, not the accused, to attend trials." Id. (citing CONCESSIONS
AND AGREEMENTS OF WEST NEW JERSEY (1677), ch. XXIII, reprinted in 1
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 129 (1971».
67. See note 88 supra.
68. The first amendment embodies a system of freedom of expression. See note
83 infra and accompanying text. A "main function of a system of freedom of expres
sion is to provide for participation in decision-making through a process of open
discussion which is available to all members of the community." Everyone is enti
tled to participate in this process of formulating decisions. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A
GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8-9 (1966).

1980]

ACCESS TO CRIMINAL TRIALS

737

and allows the public to meaningfully exercise its powers. Public
scrutiny has an even more direct effect on government conduct.
Since the parties to that conduct must act in the open, any impro
prieties are immediately laid bare for public inspection. Acts may
be done in private which the actor would not be bold enough to do
in public. 69 Publicity, therefore, has a deterrent effect on misuse of
the institutions of government, thereby increasing their effective
ness and the public's respect for them. 70
In practice, as applied to the court system, this translates into
an enhancement of the courts' fact finding function and a safeguard
against abuses of the judicial system. 71 Witnesses are more likely
to overcome the temptation to perjure themselves in public pro
ceedings. 72 Publicly reported testimony is capable of bringing forth
"[S]uppression of information ... prevents one from reaching the most rational
judgment, blocks the generation of new ideas, and tends to perpetuate error." Id. at
7. Society's judgments are made up of individual judgments. A judgment of society is
therefore "vitally conditioned by the quality of the individual judgments which com
pose it." Id. at 8. Open discussion and access to the information that makes it possi
ble are therefore imperatives for rational social judgments.
69. "[A] witness may frequently depose that in private which he will be
ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COM
MENTARIES *373.
70. The right to inspect government may be applicable to many different gov
ernment bodies and institutions and may be affected by the character of their pro
ceedings. The interaction between the right and the necessity of effective govern
ment opens up a vast field of inquiry, most of which is beyond the scope of this
comment. For an initial inquiry into the right to inspect government and govern
ment's attempts to deal with it, see Bagley, Impact of the Sunshine Act on the Pub

lic's Access to Information and on the Internal Operations of Government Agencies,
34 Bus. LAW. 1075 (1979); Cox, A Walk Through Section 552 Of The Administrative
Procedure Act: The Freedom Of Information Act; The Privacy Act; And The Govern
ment In The Sunshine Act, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 969 (1978); Ward, The Public's Access
to Government-Freedom of Information, Privacy and Sunshine Acts: An Address,
70 LAW LIB. J. 509 (1977); Comment, Government In The Sunshine Act: A Danger
Of Overexposure, 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 620 (1977); Note, The Government In The Sun
shine Act-An Overview, 1977 DUKE L. J. 565; Note, The Federal "Government In
The Sunshine Act": A Public Access Compromise, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 881 (1977).
71. "The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous re
view in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of ju
dicial power." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948). This was a habeas corpus pro
ceeding brought by a defendant sentenced to jail for contempt by a Michigan
"one-man grand jury," who ruled that contempt was in order because the defend
ant's story did not "jell" with other secret testimony. The summary manner in which
the defendant was jailed, pursuant to a proceeding in the secrecy of grand jury cham
bers, was held violative of the fourteenth amendment due process clause. Id. at 257.
72. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606 (3d Cir. Hj69) (holding that a suppres
sion hearing, held at trial with the jury sequestered, must be conducted as a public
trial where there is a question of witness credibility and where the judge alone de
termines the ultimate outcome).
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witnesses to dispute or add to what has been adduced. 73 Biases of
judges and abuses of their power may be discovered or tempered,
and their fitness for office disclosed. 74 Improper police activity will
come to light, and abuses by other officers of the court will also be
made public. 75 More is involved here than an interest in protecting
the fair trial rights of the particular defendant. Witnesses or non
parties may be abused by the judge, whose conduct may reveal
much about his fitness to fill his office, even though the acts do not
prejudice the defendant. The defendant himself may be the benefi
ciary of the misdeeds. 76
Open trials are in part based on the concern that nonparties
with a stake in the litigation need an opportunity to observe the
course of the trial or to read accounts of it in the press. This is part
of a larger concern with the appearance of justice, which is en
hanced by revelation of the testimonial and evidential bases upon
which judicial determinations are founded. "This opens the pro
cesses of government to the citizenry, and builds confidence in the
judicial system. "77 Since everyone has a stake in the outcome of
criminal trials, in that societal wrongs are redressed and members
of the public are protected from those who have demonstrated a
propensity to do them harm, every citizen has a need to observe
the criminal justice system. This is an outgrowth of the necessity of
public confidence in government institutions. 78 Those institutions
73. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948). See note 71 supra.
74. Id. See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). The Court cited ex
amples of the cleanSing effect the press has on government to support its holding
that a state act providing penalties for newspaper editorials on election day, urging
people to vote a certain way, violated the Constitution's free press guarantee. Id. at
214.
75. See United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 853 (3d Cir. 1978). For an ex
tensive theoretical discussion of the sources, premises and ramifications of the first
amendment function in checking abuses of official power, see Blasi, The Checking
Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 523,
591-611.
.
76. See United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 853 (3d Cir. 1978).
77. Id. See note 71 supra. See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
78. The public has an independent right to be present to see that justice is
fairly done. It is important that our citizens be free to observe court proceed
ings to insure a sense of confidence in the judicial process. Conducting trials
behind closed doors might engender an apprehension and distrust of the le
gal system....
United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). In a suppression
proceeding relating to the secret airline "hijacker profile," the court ruled that exclu
sion of the public from the part of the proceeding dealing with the profile did not vi
olate the right to a public trial. Id. at 1077.
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can be fully effective only if there is respect for their decisions and
for the people and methods involved in their formulation. 79 If the
institutions are not operating effectively, the people have the right
to observe the ills and formulate a remedy under our system of
government.

C.

The First Amendment

There is practically universal agreement that a major purpose
of the first amendment was to protect the free discussion and scru
tiny of governmental affairs.80 Commentary and reporting on the
criminal justice system is at the core of first amendment values. 81
For practical reasons, individual citizens are unable to person
ally gather all the information they need and are entitled to in or
der to make informed decisions about the courts. They depend on
the press. 82 The first amendment reflects the intent of the amend
ment's framers that the press be unhindered in its endeavors to re
port that which the public itself has a right to experience. 83 Access
79. "Not only is respect for the law increased and intelligent acquaintance ac
quired with the methods of government, but a strong confidence in judicial remedies
is secured which could never be inspired by a system of secrecy." 6 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1834 (3d rev. ed. 1970).
80. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). See note 74 supra.
81. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
[Tlhe operation and integrity of ... [the criminal justice] system is of crucial
import to citizens concerned with the administration of Government. Se
crecy of judicial action can only breed ignorance and distrust of courts and
suspicion concerning the competence and impartiality of judges; free and ro
bust reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute to public understanding
of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire
criminal justice system, as well as improve the quality of that system by sub
jecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability.
Id. See also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978)
(Virginia statute forbidding anyone to divulge the proceedings of a judicial review
committee held to be incompatible with the first amendment).
82. "[T]he operation of the judicial system ... is a matter of public interest,
necessarily engaging the attention of the news media." Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978).
83. Leading first amendment theorist Thomas I. Emerson asserts that the root
purpose of the amendment was to assure an effective system of freedom of expres
sion. He says that the system's:
adoption and its continued acceptance imply that some fundamental deci
sions with respect to reconciliation have been made, that a certain major bal
ancing of interests has already been performed. These judgments, these
prior balancings, are those which necessarily flow from the decision to put
into operation a system of free expression, with all the values that such a
system is intended to secure, in the realistic context of the actual func
tioning of society and its legal institutions.
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of the press to information has been restricted by the Court only
where there is a restriction on the public. 84
A free press is the only guarantee a citizen has that he may ef
fectively exercise his right to know what is going on in govern
ment. 85 As applied to the criminal justice system, this means that
members of the public are entitled to information about what is
happening to the accused. There is no other way for the majority
of citizens who cannot attend court and observe cases to evaluate
the judicial system's administration of justice except through the
media. Even while reviewing a case characterized as a "media cir
cus," the Court was able to say that a responsible press is the
"handmaiden of effective judicial administration," especially in the
criminal field. 86
In light of this judicial recognition of the role of trial publicity
as an element of the public's right to oversee government in action
and the function of the first amendment in securing this right, it is
beyond question that criminal trial closures implicate more than
the sixth amendment public trial guarantee. Closure implicates an
interest which has its roots in the first amendment. That amend
ment protects the free discussion of government affairs so that citi
zens can make intelligent appraisals of government institutions,
their operation, and the people who run them. 87 Ultimately, the
EMERSON, supra note 68, at 59. One such judgment is that expression is to be freely
allowed and encouraged. Id. "Expression," as Emerson uses the tenn, encompasses
more than mere verl?alization or memorialization of ideas. It is part of a continuum
along which an idea is fonnulated, discussed, refined, assigned a niche in the hier
archy of ideas and implemented. The first amendment protects "expression," as op
posed to "action." The distinction rests on the immediacy and irremediability of the
effect of the activity. The more immediate and irremediable the purported effect,
(hann to fair trial rights, in the case of criminal trial access) the farther the activity
shifts to the "action" end of the action/expression continuum. Id. at 60. The right of
access can be protected without immediate or irremediable adverse effect on fair
trial rights. See notes 139-56 infra and accompanying text.
84. See notes 16-20 supra and accompanying text.
85. See State ex rei. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457,
467,351 N.E.2d 127, 134 (1976) (an order excluding the public and barring the press
from publishing reports on a suppression hearing was held violative of the first and
sixth amendments).
86. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 350. "Its function in this regard is docu
mented by an impressive record of service over several centuries. The press does not
simply publish infonnation about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice
by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scru
tiny and criticism." Id.
87. Justice William Brennan says that there are two distinct and legitimate
models of the role of the first amendment. The first is the "speech" model. "Accord
ing to this traditional 'speech' model, the primary purpose of the First Amendment is
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citizens' right to prompt change when they identify a need cannot
be meaningful unless there is a right of access to the information
which will allow intelligent, fully informed discussion. 88 This inter
est is not too remote from the first amendment to benefit from
constitutional protection. It militates for more than "a common-law

more or less absolutely to prohibit any interference with freedom of expression."
Brennan, Why Protect the Press?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.lFeb. 1980, 59, at
60.
The model which applies to trial closure, however, is the second, "structural,"
model. This model is based on the idea that:
[T]he First Amendment protects the structure of communications necessary
for the existence of our democracy. This insight suggests the second model
to describe the role of the press in our society. This second model is struc
tural in nature. It focuses on the relationship of the press to the communica
tive functions required by our democratic beliefs. To the extent the press
makes these functions possible, this model requires that it receive the pro
tection of the First Amendment. A good example is the press's role in pro
viding and circulating the information necessary for informed public
discussion. To the extent the press, or, for that matter, to the extent that any
institution uniquely performs this role, it should receive unique First
Amendment protection.
[d. Brennan says that the protection accorded under the first model is absolute. That
accorded under the "structural" model involves protection of interests which "may
conflict with other societal interests and adjustment of the conflict on occasion favors
the competing claim." [d.
88. The [First] Amendment therefore also forbids the government from
interfering with the communicative process through which we citizens exer
cise and prepare to exercise our rights of self-government. The individual
right to speak out, even millions of such rights aggregated together, will not
sufficiently protect these social interests. It is in recognition of this fact that
. . . the Court has referred to "the circulation of information to which the
public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guarantees."
[d. (emphasis supplied by Justice Brennan) (quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)).
Intelligent self-government requires that the electorate be sufficiently
informed of the problems that face the country and of the potential solutions
of those problems. The first amendment stands as a bar to government re
strictions placed on the publication of information necessary for enlightened
public policy and electoral decisionmaking. But if the citizenry has no ef
fective means to gain this information, even an expansive right to dissemi
nate available information is of little value. In other areas courts have recog
nized that simply granting a right to do something is not sufficient if it is
impossible to take advantage of such a grant. For example, because the right
to an attorney in a criminal action means little if one cannot afford to hire an
attorney, government has fostered the right by providing appointed attor
neys. The argument that the goals of the first amendment require an accom
panying right to gather news proceeds on much the same analysis.
Pember, The Burgeoning Scope of "Access Privacy" and the Portent for a Free
Press, 64 IOWA L. REV. 1155, 1166 (1979). See also note 68 supra and accompanying
text.
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rule of open .. criminal proceedings. "89 The ninth amendment
bestows constitutional protection on fundamental personal rights
even if they are not specifically listed in the first eight constitu
tional amendments. 9o The histories of the first and ninth amend
ments combine to indicate that the right of access to criminal trials
is a fundamental personal right and is due constitutional respect
under those amendments.
D.

The Ninth Amendment
1.

Purpose of the Amendment

"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peoPIe. "91
This, the ninth amendment, was a product of the apprehen
sion of its author, James Madison, that the Bill of Rights might be
construed as a denial of unenumerated rights or as a grant of fed
eral power in the areas not covered by the enumeration. 92 Madison
inserted the amendment into the Bill of Rights out of caution, 93
despite the fact that the framers of the Constitution upheld the
English tradition that basic, natural, and fundamental individual
rights were protected whether enumerated specifically in a consti
tution or not. 94 But the amendment is more than an exclamation
point on the doctrine that the federal government is one of dele
gated and enumerated powers. 95 An amendment that protects
unenumerated rights is pointless without unenumerated rights to

89. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 384.
90. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 492 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(Connecticut anti-contraception law ruled unconstitutional as invading a zone of pri
vacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
92. [Bly enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it
might follow, by implication, that those rights which were not signalled out,
were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government
and were consequently insecure.
B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 13 (1955) (quoting Madison, 1
ANNALS OF CONGo 439 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1834). The ninth amendment is almost
exclusively the work of Madison. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
93. PATTERSON, supra note 92, at 13.
94. Id. at 7.
95. Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L. J.
309, 323 (1936).
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protect. The Founders did not indulge in irrelevant exercise. 96
Unenumerated rights must exist. 97 The amendment underscores
the idea that certain rights may have been unintentionally omitted
from the Bill of Rights, and that the inadequacy of language to ex
press certain ideals might adversely affect other rights intended to
be included. 98
In short, there can be little doubt as to the existence of pro
tected, but unenumerated rights. Madison's writings indicate that
the ninth amendment was borne of his belief in the impossibility of
a comprehensive description of personal rights. Moreover, the
English concept of inherent individual liberties, existing ir
respective of government, was pervasive among the framers of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The last thought in their minds
was to construct a constitution as a grant to the individual of inher
ent rights and liberties. 99 It was a conveyance of powers to the fed
eral government from the people and no more. Individual inherent
rights and liberties were thought to antedate and occupy a level
above constitutions; they were pre-constitutional rights. 100 They in
here in the nature of man and subordinate his constitutions. Since
the Constitution is incompetent to grant or fully describe a citizen's
rights, it cannot be evidence against the existence of a right, but
can only indicate the undisputed recognition of some and the ne
cessity of others, in light of the human condition.
In sum, the ninth amendment is notice both that the Bill of
Rights is not all-inclusive, and that those rights listed may have

96. It has been held that in interpreting the Constitution, every word must
have its due force and meaning; that no word was unnecessarily used or
needlessly added; that no word can be rejected as superfluous and unmean
ing.
With this rule in mind we must therefore assume that in the minds of
the framers of this amendment, other rights than those "enumerated" did,
and supposedly do now, exist.
[d. at 312-13. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
97. The ninth amendment:
must be more than a mere net to catch fish in supposedly fishless water.
.. : It must be a positive declaration of existing, though unnamed rights,
which may be vindicated under the authority of the amendment whenever
and if ever any governmental authority shall aspire to ungranted power in
contravention of "unenumerated rights."
Kelsey, supra note 95, at 313.
98. Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained By the People"?, 37
N.Y.U.L. REV. 787, 805 (1962).
99. PATTERSON, supra note 92, at 19.
100. [d. at 20.
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been inadequately or incompletely described. It stands for the con
cept that rights are not created by their expression in constitutional
writings, but merely acknowledged, and, on occasion, without ade
quate description. The amendment sanctions the search for rights
not enumerated. Of greater potential importance, however, is its
sanction of intra- and extra-constitutional illumination of the enu
merated rights beyond their black letters, where those letters do
not by themselves convey the breadth and limits of the protection
which the rights afford. The concern which gave birth to the
amendment indicate that the term "unenumerated rights" was
meant to encompass both concepts. lOl
2.

The Unenumerated Rights

The unenumerated rights may be identified through analysis of
two paradigms. The first is the English concept of inherent per
sonal rights, which were fought for in the Revolutionary War. 102
The rights listed by Blackstone are probably more exact statements
of those rights which the Founders intended to protect in the Con
stitution and the ninth amendment than any other theoretical or
philosophic compilation and classification of rights. lo3 Blackstone
said that these rights consist primarily of the free enjoyment of
personal security, personal liberty and private property, with a
supportive infrastructure of subsidiary rightS. 104
The second pattern which may be used to identify un
enumerated rights is the Constitution itself. The ninth amendment
101. "The fear that certain rights may have been omitted, and that the vagaries
of language might adversely affect other rights intended to be included, led Madison
to the Ninth Amendment." Redlich, supra note 98, at 805. An important factor to
keep in mind with regard to the identification of unenumerated rights, be they rights
unnamed in the Constitution, or emanations of enumerated rights, is that the rights
protected by the ninth amendment are not fixed by the date of the amendment's
adoption. The amendment was intended to be a living document. As the American
nation and government grows and develops, the necessity of "new" rights may be
come apparent in the light of current history. The spirit of the constitution and the
letter of the ninth amendment demand that these rights be recognized and protected.
PATTERSON, supra note 92, at 53-56.
102. The Founding Fathers were children of the English political milieu. They
were not concerned with fashioning a system of rights from whole cloth, but with
perfecting the acquisition of English rights. "The Colonists had argued, petitioned
and contended, and finally waged war, not for philosophic perfection of any utilitar
ian doctrine of rights, but for the rights of Englishmen." Kelsey, supra note 95, at
313.
103. Id. at 313-14. Blackstone's Commentaries were heavily circulated in colo
nial America. Id. at 313.
104. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143-44.
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refers to rights retained by the people despite the enumeration of
other rights in the Constitution,105 as opposed to the Bill of Rights.
The whole text of the Constitution, therefore, becomes the
standard for analysis of potential ninth amendment rights. 106 The
sense, the aura, the gist of what the Constitution establishes, the
essence of the institutions it ordains, are as informative of the pre
rogatives of citizenship as the enumerations of the first eight
amendments. For the Constitution establishes more than the
pieces of government; it establishes an idea. That idea is an image
of a free and open society.107 It is a system that was truly intended
to be a government of and by the people. The constitutional scheme
was designed so that the citizenry would have the right to the raw
material, the knowledge, which is essential to the exercise of its ul
timate power of government,108 reflected in the Constitution's
portrayal of a free and open society.
But the ninth amendment recognized that it is impossible to
fill in every detail of this image. For that reason certain rights were
reserved to the people. 109 The unenumerated rights, then, are
those pieces necessary to complete the picture of the free, open so
ciety which is framed by the Constitution. These rights were re
tained by the people not because they were different from the
rights . specifically mentioned in the Constitution, but because
words were considered inadequate to define all the rights which
man should possess in a free society.110 So the ninth amendment
fills in the blanks, defining rights adjacent or analogous to the pat
tern of rights which we find in the Constitution. 1ll It stands for the
proposition that the enumerated rights and the essences of the so
ciety envisioned by the Constitution are not to be eviscerated by
the non-enumeration of rights necessary to their fulfillment. To the
extent that a putative right is necessary to give full effect to the so
cial order of the Constitution, it exists and is due constitutional
protection. 112
105. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
Redlich, supra note 98, at BlO.
107. ld.
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
109. Redlich, supra note 98, at B10.
1l0. ld. at Bll.
lll. ld. at B12.
112. One ninth amendment commentator, Bennett Patterson, has stressed the
idea that the rights protected by the amendment are necessarily "personal" rights, as
opposed to public or collective ones. "Personal" rights are those which actively con
fer the right to do or refrain from doing something, and provide that the forge of gov
106.
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The Ninth Amendment Protects Access to Criminal Trials

The right of access to criminal trials is a detail of the first
amendment that was not filled in. The first amendment was en
acted in part to allow effective and informed citizen participation in
the exercise of the right of citizenship. Without the right to ob
serve government in operation, the rights to discuss it, to form
opinions about it, and to act on those impressions are gutted. This
result cannot have been countenanced by the Founders in view of
the open and free society the Constitution embodies. The Court
has recognized that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance. 113 The right of access to criminal
ernment stands behind the individual who asserts it, against all who would deny it.
The ninth amendment protects rights which individuals must have if they are to
fully develop their potentials as citizens in the framework of the Constitution. This
contrasts with "public" rights, which are those characterized by government inaction
in an area. The "public right" is merely a function of the absence of government reg
ulation resulting in lack of restraint on the masses. It exists until government legally
acts to deny, restrict or define it. PATTERSON, supra note 92, at 60-61. For example,
the right to engage in the manufacture, sale or transportation of liquor was a public
right, unrestrained by government, until the eighteenth amendment was adopted,
denying it. It became such a right again when the twenty-first amendment removed
the restrictions. Government restriction in an area of public right (e.g. health
standards on manufacture of liquor; zoning standards on its sale) does not deny the
right, but sets its boundaries. Patterson theorizes that collective rights are protected
by the "General Welfare" clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. PATTERSON, supra note 92,
at 57. Other commentators call Patterson's "personal" rights "natural" or "inherent."
Natural rights, such as are declared to be inalienable and which, as such, are
personal to every individual as a citizen of a free community, include: the
right to personal liberty, to personal security, to acquire and enjoy property,
to religious liberty, to freedom of conscience, to freedom of contract, to free
dom of the press, speech, assemblage, petition, to freedom to engage in a
profession, trade, business, or calling, and the right of privacy.
Kelsey, supra note 95, at 313 (and at 310 on the personal/public right distinction).
The right of access is a personal one. It has historically been recognized as inci
dent to the citizen's right to inspect the government. It is not a right capable of exer
cise merely because of a lack of government regulation. To the extent that govern
ment has not acted to regulate access, it has been in recognition of the Court's own
admission that "there is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as
distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or
censor events which transpire in proceedings before it." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.
367, 374 (1947). To the extent that the courts do attempt to unduly restrict access,
they act in derogation of the individual's right. It is a right of the type protected by
the ninth amendment, because the individual claims an enforceable right to observe,
born of necessity inherent in the concept of open government and his other rights
under it. It is much more than a wish to be left unregulated as to an activity which
has not been subjected to an exercise of government power.
113. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
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trials properly belongs on the list of rights 114 emanating from the
first amendment. It is necessary to the fulfillment of the American
constitutional scheme of openness and to the accomplishment of
the informed discussion protected by the first amendment. It must,
therefore, qualify for the protection of the ninth amendment,
which confers constitutional status on emanations of enumerated
rights when those emanations are necessary to the completion of
the constitutional scheme. The right of access is a personal 115 and
fundamental 116 right of the citizen, a detail of his first amendment
rights, and necessary to that amendment's intended operation.
That the right of access to criminal trials was not specified in
the first amendment is easily explained. The amendment would
have been incredibly unwieldy had it spelled out every context in
which a right of citizen access is necessary to a meaningful exercise
of other first amendment guarantees. Yet it cannot be argued that
the right of access is not "adjacent" to the amendment, that is, a
right necessary to the fulfillment of first amendment intent. For
what is a right of free speech, without a source of information for
that speech? To what avail is one encouraged to discuss his govern
ment, and assured a free press to help him, if that government
seals its institutions from observation? The right of access makes
the first amendment meaningful, with regard to the criminal courts.
The final evidence that the right of access qualifies for consti
tutional protection under the ninth amendment umbrella is that ac
cess was a part of the system of English rights which the Founders
intended to incorporate into the Constitution and Bill of Rights. 117
Blackstone, the period's principal expositor of English rights, was
perhaps the single most influential source of the Founders' con
cepts of personal rights. 11s He posited three primary rights: per
sonal security; personal liberty; and private property.119 These
rights are secured and protected by a system of auxiliary subordinate
rights. 120 Blackstone saw the right of access to criminal courts as a
114. [d. at 482.
115. See note 112 supra.
116. The test of whether a right is fundamental is whether it has become so
rooted in the nation's collective conscience that its denial violates fundamental prin
ciples of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institu
tions. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932), on the nature of fundamental rights.
117. See notes 102-04 supra and accompanying text.
118. Kelsey, supra note 95, at 313-14.
119. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *141.
120. But in vain would these rights be declared, ascertained and protected
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necessary outgrowth of the subordinate right of every Englishman
to apply to the courts for redress of injuries. 121 There are two
bases for this construction. The first is that criminal offenses harm
not only the victim of the crime, but the citizens of the govern
ment which formulates and enforces the laws defining the crime.
Criminal offenses are an affront to the code of lawful behavior, es
tablished through the democratic process, which citizens use to
govern the limits of their conduct in a sort of quid pro quo ex
change for the expectation that others will similarly honor the sys
tem. In the breach of that expectation every citizen is harmed,
since the ability of the law to function as a code of civility upon
which the citizen may rely for his safety, health and the protection
of his property is undermined. In effect, then, the criminal prose
cution becomes the application of all citizens to the court for re
dress of injury to their reliance interest in the system of civility.
Since every citizen is thus a party to every criminal action, he has
a party's right to observe the court system's handling of it.
The second element which forms the right of access to the
courts is the requirement that justice "be duly administered
therein. "122 Blackstone recognized the salutary effects of publicity
in the conduct of justice;123 the echoes of that recognition still
sound in the decisions of American courts. 124

by the dead letter of the laws, if the constitution had provided no other
method to secure their actual enjoyment. It has, therefore, established cer
tain other auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally
as outworks or barriers, to protect and maintain inviolate the three great and
primary rights....
Id. at *140-41.
121. "Since the law is in England the supreme arbiter of every man's life, lib
erty, and property, courts of justice must at all times be open to the subject; and the
law be duly administered therein." Id. at *141. By his reference to the arbitration of
life and liberty, Blackstone clearly includes access to the criminal courts within the
scope of this right. Id.
122. Id.
123. [Ajll ... evidence is to be given in open court, in the presence of the
parties, their attorneys, the counsel and all bystanders, and before the judge
and jury; ... exceptions are publicly stated, and by the judge are openly and
publicly allowed or disallowed, in the face of the country: which must curb
any secret bias or partiality that might arise in his own breast.... This open
examination of witnesses ... , in the presence of all mankind, is much more
conducive to the clearing up of truth than ... private and secret examina
tion.... [Aj witness may frequently depose that in private which he will be
ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372-73.
124. See notes 71-77 supra and accompanying text.

1980]

ACCESS TO CRIMINAL TRIALS

749

Even if one were to disbelieve that the Founders intended to
incorporate their heritage of traditional English rights into the
Constitution through the ninth amendment, the Constitution itself
argues persuasively for a personal right of access to criminal courts.
This is simply because the criminal courts are engaged in the
formal conduct of government business, and the right of access to
government proceedings by the people as a check on the function
of the system is an integral and necessary part of our form of gov
ernment. It is premised in the power of citizens to control, how
ever indirectly through the legislative and elective process, the
way in which the government will operate and to hold it account
able to them.
So the right of the common citizen to observe criminal trials is
more than a mere "interest." It has an ancient origin and exists in
dependently of defendants' rights to a fair trial. It is a way of pro
tecting the integrity of our system and is incorporated into the
Constitution by the ninth amendment. 125 Its abridgement by the
states is constrained by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. 126
125. The ninth amendment has frequently been linked with the tenth amend
ment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X. Neither has seen extensive judicial use, although the tenth
amendment is enjoying a limited revival of sorts. See, e.g., National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act may not be applied to state employees); Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (wage "freeze" legislation may be applied to state em
ployees). These cases reject the old idea that the tenth amendment is a mere
"truism," stating merely that "all is retained which has not been surrendered."
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). The court in Fry held that the
tenth amendment forbids the exercise of federal power "in a fashion that impairs the
States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system." Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. at 547. The Court in Fry, however, did not address the
amendment's last four words, which make it a complement to the ninth amendment:
The last four words of the Tenth Amendment must have been added to con
form its meaning to the Ninth Amendment and to carry out the intent of
both-that as to the federal government there were rights, not enumerated
in the Constitution, which were "retained ... by the people," and that be
cause the people possessed such rights there were powers which neither the
federal government nor the states possessed.
Redlich, supra note 98, at 807.
The reliance on the ninth amendment by Justice Goldberg in his concurring
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur
ring; joined by Warren, C.J. and· Brennan, J.), is the lonely modem example of the
use of either the ninth or tenth amendment to vindicate a right or power in the indi
vidual not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. The ninth amendment in par
ticular remains one of the great unmined veins of American constitutional law.
126. Patterson contends that the amendment was intended to apply to the
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Other Questions

The establishment of a constitutional right of access to criminal
trials raises many subsidiary questions of interest, not all of which
can be addressed here. Two issues, though, merit some discussion.
The first is squaring the right with the Pell, Saxbe and Houchins
line of Supreme Court cases,127 denying a public right of access to
prisons. Prisons are, of course, an arm of government. Everything
said thus far about a generalized right of access to government
applies with equal force to prisons. Yet there is a difference which
militates for applying the right of access to criminal trials and
denying it for prisons. The difference is that prisons are generally
closed, and courtrooms are generally open, for good reason. To say
that because the press and public may be barred from one, they
may also be barred from the other suggests a disturbing
insensitivity to the different societal roles played by the two insti
tutions. 128 The prison system is not the preeminent institution
charged with safeguarding the rights of citizens and society. The
court system is. It determines the ultimate correctness and effect
of all actions undertaken by law enforcement and prosecuting
agencies in the name of justice. Therefore prisons cannot claim the
traditional right of access that criminal courts can. The tradition
does not exist as to prisons because of their different role, and the
idea of a right to view them certainly was foreign to the Founders.
Moreover, even the right of access to criminal courts is not abso
lute,129 and special problems of security inhere in prisons that do
not exist to the same degree in criminal courts. 130 One further dis
tinction is that the right of access to criminal trials is a personal
right of every citizen. It is not the special right of press access de
nounced by the Pell, Saxbe and Houchins triumvirate. 13l Those
cases are inapposite to this issue.
A second issue is the availability of transcripts as a substitute
for personal presence in the courts. At best, transcripts provide a
states from the beginning. PATTERSON, supra note 92, at 13. Redlich thinks not, but
claims that the fourteenth amendment makes the issue moot. Redlich, supra note 98,
at 805-06.
127. See notes 16-20 supra and accompanying text.
128. Brief amicus curiae for New York Times Co. at 12, Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
129. See notes 138-48 infra and accompanying text.
130. See Pel! v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 827; Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. at 848-49.
131. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 834.
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cold record of the proceedings, which are no longer news, but his
tory.l32 Because of the nature of the news media, reportage that is
chronologically remote from the occurrence is not given the play it
would normally deserve. Its value as news is diminished, and
therefore much of it may never see print. Whatever does eventu
ally become available may come at a time when publication is less
desirable to the media. Yesterday's news is devalued currency in a
business in which timing is of the essence.1 33 Even if the whole
transcript is published, it is a sterile substitute for observing the
actual conduct of a hearing; as reviewing courts are well aware.
The demeanor, voice, and gestures of the participants are as in
formative to the press and public as they are to the juries which
use these elements at trial to decide facts. l34
Reliance on transcripts is, therefore, an inadequate substitute
for a personal right of access. First, it means that information about
the proceeding may never get to the citizen, who relies on the
press to gather his information. l35 The press deals in current
events, and may be unable, due to the press of current news, to
devote adequate attention and space to the distillation and presen
tation of a stale transcript. Secondly, a transcript cannot convey the
intangibles, such as atmosphere, speech intonations, gestures, and
demeanor, which are important elements of comprehensive report
age of criminal trials.
Finally, before addressing the extent of the right of access,· it
should be noted that there has been judiciaP36 or legislative l37 rec
ognition of the public right to attend criminal trials in several
states. The reasoning used by the courts to support the right traces
much of what has been said in this comment. l3S

132. Fenner & Koley, The Rights of the Press and the Closed Court Criminal
Proceeding, 57 NEB. L. REV. 442,454 (1978).
133. Id. at 464.
134. State ex rei. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 471,
351 N.E.2d 127, 136 (1976) (Stern, J., concurring).
135. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
136. E.g., State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457,
35l N.E.2d 127 (1976); Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1968).
137. E.g., MICH. COMPo LAWS § 600.1420 (1968); N.Y. JUDIClARY LAW § 4
(McKinney 1968).
138. See Detroit Free Press V. Macomb, 4 MED. L. RPTR. (BNA) 2180 (Mich.
1979) (discussing MICH. COMPo LAWS § 600.1420 (1968)); New York v. Green, 4
MED. L. RPTR. (BNA) 1561 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (discussing N.Y. JUDIClARY LAW § 4
(McKinney 1968)). See also note 136 supra and accompanying text.
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PARAMETERS OF THE RIGHT

Accommodation of Competing Rights
No one asserts that the right to be present at criminal trials is
absolute, but there is agreement that it is due much more than lip
service. Blackstone classified it among those rights and liberties
which should be restrained only when and to the extent absolutely
necessary to accommodate other rights. 139 This concept of accom
modation of rights has carried through to American jurisprudence.
When first and sixth amendment rights conflict, the trial court is
required to resolve the conflict by protecting both rights when that
can reasonably be done. 14o Because the right of access implicates a
fundamental personal liberty, a compelling subordinating interest is
required before the right may be overridden. 141 Courts have prop
erly found such an interest, and have closed courts to some extent,
in cases where the closure aids the court in the production of evi
dence necessary to the function of justice. 142 The press performs a
fiduciary duty to the courts and to the defendants when it
cooperates with this type of closure. 143
But the Court has held that justice does not require jurors to
be kept in total ignorance of the circumstances of a case, save those
which surface in court. Neither does it require that they refrain
from forming opinions based on arguably prejudicial extrajudicial
information. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression
A.

139. [It is a right which] it is our birth-right to enjoy entire; unless where
the laws of our country have laid them under necessary restraints. Restraints
in themselves so gentle and moderate, as will appear upon further inquiry,
that no man of sense or probity would wish to see them slackened. For all of
us ... are restrained from nothing, but what would be pernicious either to
ourselves or our fellow-citizens.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144.
140. State ex rei. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 464,
351 N.E.2d 127, 132 (1976).
141. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur
ring).
142. E.g., in cases involving young witnesses or victims of crime, rape victims,
undercover police officers and similar cases where witnesses might be unwilling to
present their testimony in public for judicially cognizable reasons, or are likely to be
able to testify more freely with the public excluded. See, e.g., United States v.
Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1979) & United States v. Powers, 477 F. Supp.
497 (S.D. Iowa 1979), two cases in which it was asserted that witnesses or their fami
lies would be in physical danger if the public were admitted to hear their direct tes
timony. See also United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), where
the court closed the proceeding during discussion of secret airline hijacker profile.
143. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 560.
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or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented
in court. 144
The Court has recognized that even pervasive adverse public
ity does not inevitably result in an unfair trial. The ability of a jury
to decide a case fairly is shaded by the tone and extent of the pub
licity, which is often, in large part, shaped by what attorneys, po
lice, and other officials do to precipitate news coverage. 145 This, in
turn, is within the power of the judge to control. 146
In fact, courts and commentators have pointed out that it is
the unusual criminal prosecution which generates publicity which
could do harm to a defendant's rights.1 47 Closure itself may, in
144. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). The defendant, convicted of mur
der, sought habeas corpus on the grounds that publicity giving the sordid details of
his past life, previous convictions and alleged confessions and plea bargaining prior
to voir dire had biased the jury. The Court held that even a juror with a formed opin
ion of the defendant's guilt may be impartial, if able to lay the opinion aside and
render a verdict on the evidence. The facts here, however, indicated a pattern of
deep and bitter prejudice in the community that precluded impartiality. Habeas Cor
pus was directed. Id. at 728-29.
In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication,
an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the
vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not
have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is
particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any
preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without
more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's imparti
ality would be to establish an impossible standard.
Id. at 722-23.
145. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 554-55.
146. See notes 5-9 supra and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., People v. Biggs,S MED. L. RPTR. (BNA) 1518 (N.Y. Suffolk
County Ct., Aug. 15, 1979) (motion to close pre-trial hearing denied on grounds that
the case had received little or no coverage).
Most judicial proceedings in criminal cases attract no attention or such little
attention as to be inSignificant. Even in the case which seems more "news
worthy," the court still must speculate as to the form of the publicity, its
context, its intensity, its frequency, its longevity, and in short, all of those
things which go to make up its impact.
Fenner & Koley, supra note 131, at 516-17.
Judge Skelly Wright, of the D.C. Court of Appeals, has stated in discussing
the issues of free press and fair trial that there is no problem at all in the
great majority of the hundreds of thousands of criminal cases which are
brought each year in this country because less than one percent of the cases
are ever given a line of notice i.n tI:Ie press and of that one percent seventy
five to ninety percent plead guilty. So, as-Judge Wright has pointed out,
what is involved is a small fraction of the less than Olle percent of the crimi
nal cases brought.
A. Cox, M. HOWE, & J.R. WIGGINS, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
COURTS, 56, 70-71 (1967) (quoted in Fenner & Koley, supra note 132, at 517 n.329).
See also notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
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some cases, have a detrimental effect on fair trial rights that out
weighs the potential harm of publicity. 148 All of this argues for ac
commodation of competing rights. An order which implicates first
amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that
will accomplish both the precise objective permitted by the Consti
tution and the essential needs of public order. 149 In other words,
accommodation of fair trial rights should be accomplished with as
little prejudice as possible to the right of the public to observe its
criminal court trials.

B.

Closing the Trial

In the wake of the closure phenomenon spawned by Nebraska
Press, various courts, government bodies and organizations pro
posed standards for closing criminal proceedings. A senate subcom
mittee suggested that courts should be closed only when necessary
to protect the rights of the accused, upon a showing that no
alternative protective measures are likely to work. The proceeding
may then be closed only to the extent absolutely necessary to pro
tect the endangered rights. 150
The American Bar Association proposed standards 151 that allow
the exclusion of the public from that portion of a trial before an
unsequestered jury which takes place out of the hearing of the
jury. The standards require several conditions to be present before
even this limited closure is allowed: a clear and present danger to
the fairness of the trial posed by dissemination of the information
to be discussed; a lack of alternative means of avoiding the prejudi
148. Closing a hearing would not restrict the press, in its various compo
nent parts, from, for example, gathering news in other ways and then pub
lishing that news, publishing whatever information by chance or by design
leaks out, however accurate or garbled the leaked information may be, or
even indulging in speculation or publicizing gossip or rumors-gossip
spawned in part perhaps by the secrecy surrounding the closed proceeding,
rumors which "could well be more damaging than reasonably accurate news
accounts."
Fenner & Koley, supra note 132, at 521 (quoting, in part, Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. at 567).
149. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968)
(ex parte order restraining "white supremacist" rally set aside as not comporting with
procedural minima required in cases which reach first amendment rights); See notes
150-56 infra.

150. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2n SESS., FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL (Comm. Print 1976).
151. ABA, Standards Relating To The Administration of Criminal Justice-Fair
Trial and Free Press, § 8-3.6, at 22-27 (Approved Draft, 1978).
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cial effect; and the defendant's consent. A transcript of the closed
part of the trial should be made available to the public following
the completion of the trial, or earlier if fairness permits. This is the
only context in which the American Bar Association standards
would allow closure. 152
A third formula is that of the Gannett dissent, which closely
mirrors the Nebraska Press standards for gag orders. It would re
quire a finding that there is a substantial probability that irrepara
ble damage to the fair trial right will result from publicity,
alternatives to closure would not protect the fair trial right, and
that closl.lre will protect the defendant from the perceived harm. 153
One proposed standard that would on its face appear to be in
capable of cutting constitutional mustard is that of the Gannett ma
jority.154 It contemplates a "balancing" of the constitutional rights
involved which would result in closure upon a showing of a "rea
sonable probability of prejudice." This is an exceedingly vague and
ill-formed approach to the resolution of a conflict between funda
mental rights. The opinion does not discuss alternatives that could
solve the conflicts without impinging on the rights of the public.
Furthermore, its standard of "reasonable probability" does not ap
proach the strict necessity,155 the clear and present danger to an
other fundamental right, that should be required before such a
right must yield.
Of these various approaches, the American Bar Association
version approaches the ideal. Most importantly, it incorporates the
clear and present danger test, which is the appropriate yardstick in
a case of conflict between fundamental rights. 15s Secondly, it prop
erly narrows the availability of closure to trials with an un
sequestered jury, and the scope of closure to proceedings held out
of the hearing of that jury. Finally, it requires the consideration of
alternatives to closure. It is the best available accommodation be
152. The commentary that accompanies the standards notes that:
Closure orders, like prior restraints on the press, have strong appeal as fair
trial procedures because of their minimal cost, directness, and relative effi
ciency in tenns of the use of the court's time. These administrative advan
tages, however, must be set aside in the face of the strong constitutional pol
icy in favor of public trials.
Id. at 26.
153. 443 U.S. at 441-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
154. 443 U.S. at 392-93.
155. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur
ring).
156. EMERSON, supra note 68, at 73.
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tween the rights of citizens to attend criminal trials and the rights
of defendants to have a fair trial. It restricts closure to the minimal
intrusion on the right of access which will support a fair trial in the
presence of prejudicial publicity.
C.

Procedural Issues

The initial procedural issue raised by a closure motion is the
question of who should make the decision. One view is that the
trial judge is not qualified to decide because he is an interested
party. In the face of allegedly pervasive prejudicial publicity, a clo
sure order is an easy OUt. 157 It eliminates the need to define the
limits of the closure with neither over- nor under-inclusiveness.
It allows the trial to proceed quickly. It obviates the need for
continuing monitoring of the possible effects of publicity on the
trial. The judge will be inclined to decide that in his court nothing
will occur which needs public exposure. Lack of judicial detach
ment is inherent in this situation. 158 The obvious way out of this
dilemma is to provide that closure decisions are to be made at the
next level up the appellate ladder. Closure decisions should be
among the appellate courts' highest priorities.
Secondly, courts should not routinely grant uncontested clo
sure motions. The fact that a motion is uncontested probably indi
cates that the level of prejudicial publicity will not reach the point
where the right of access should be overridden. 159 The right to be
present deserves protection, even when it is not being asserted,
because of its significant constitutional dimension. 16o
The court must also provide the media with notice and an op
portunity to participate in an adversary hearing. 161 Realistically,
this is the only way to assure that the court will hear both sides of
the access issue. The prosecution is unlikely to be as interested in
promoting the public right of access as the press would be. The
157. "Judges are men, not angels. While some would exercise the power of
censorship with high regard for the true interests of the judicial process, others
might exercise it to prevent proper criticism of their own administration of office."
Rifkind, When the Press Collides with Justice in SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITU
TIONAL LAW 651, 653 (Ass'n of American Law Schools ed. 1963) (quoted by Fenner
& Koley, supra note 132, at 481).
158. Fenner & Koley, supra note 132, at 465.
159. See notes 147-49 supra and accompanying text.
160. See People v. Biggs, 5 MED. L. RPTR. (BNA)' 1518 (Suffolk County Ct.,
N.Y. Aug. 15, 1979); Note, Trial Secrecy And The First Amendment Right Of Public
Access To Judicial Proceedings, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1899, 1910 (1978).
161. Fenner & Koley, supra note 132, at 451, 455.
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judge is likely to be antagonistic to it, at least on a subliminal
level, because closure decreases the burden of monitoring fairness
and elevates the risk of reversal attendant to open trials held in an
atmosphere of heavy publicity.
Finally, there must be a mechanism for an accelerated appeal
of a closure ruling. The right of access would be meaningless if
courts were allowed to hold closed trials while appeal of the clo
sure order was in process. If a restraint on access is sought which
arguably works a deprivation of first amendment rights, it must be
accompanied by immediate appellate review, and a stay must be
granted in the interim. 162
VI.

CONCLUSION

To the extent that Gannett has been used to justify criminal
trial closure, it has been misconstrued. The case cannot extend be
yond its facts because every citizen has a constitutional right under
the first and ninth amendments to attend criminal trials. This right
exists independently of the right of ~he defendant to a fair trial. It
is an element of the right of the citizen to inspect the functioning
of government institutions, a right with its origins in English com
mon law. It is a right protected by the ninth amendment, both be
cause it was considered an inherent natural right by the Founders
and because it is a natural and necessary concomitant of the open
society that the Constitution reflects. It also merits ninth amend
ment protection by virtue of being necessary to the fulfillment of
the first amendment. It is a "detail" that was left out of a document
that was not intended to be all-inclusive.
The first amendment's purpose is to allow citizens to
meaningfully exercise their ultimate power of government. It al
lows them to evaluate government so they may act on that evalua
tion. By subjecting the courts to constant scrutiny, citizens are as
sured of the courts' just operation. The right to be so assured is an
interest which inheres in every citizen.
But the right of access is not absolute. Courts need latitude to
162. National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (state supreme
court denial of stay pending appeal of injunction against parade by American Nazis
reversed). In a per curiam opinion, the United States Supreme Court said that court
orders which work a deprivation of asserted first amendment rights during the pen
dency of appeal require immediate appellate review. The opinion's context indicates
that an "immediate" review is one which takes place before the petitioner's in
tended exercise of his asserted right. "Absent such review, the State must instead al
Iowa stay." Id. at 44.
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perform their duties efficiently in some cases. In others, the ability
of a defendant to secure a fair trial may truly be prejudiced by
publicity. The right of access, however, is due all the protection
which can be afforded it, consistent with the protection of the de
fendant's rights. The gravest necessity should be shown before the
right to attend may be overridden, and closure should not be re
sorted to unless it is the sole available method which will protect
sixth amendment interests. The closure decision belongs in a disin
terested court. Every procedural safeguard should be used to pro
tect the integrity of the right of access, which lies at the root of the
first amendment.

Charles W. Danis, Jr.

